Reconfiguring the UART when the FIFO is not empty may cause the boot to
hang. This hang is extremely suspectible to timing differences; recompiling
the kernel with the same configuration, but different UTS_VERSION
timestamps can yield images that hang more or less often. Sometimes images
are produced that hang reproducibly.
This patch should also make it into one of the next linux-stable releases,
but it's better to get this fixed as soon as possible.
Fixes#21773, #21857.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Backport of r49156
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49202 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
the fullduplex on CS1 is broken. remove the fullduplex support and run on
plain half duplex on both CS lines.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49201 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
there is a deadlock that triggers under heavy bus load. until the bug is
fxed, revert to an old version of the I2C driver that does not suffer
from this issue.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49200 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
We need to fix Seama just like we fix TRX due to the rootfs mark.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Backport of r48522
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49170 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
There are D-Link bcm53xx devices using Seama format.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Backport of r48521
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49169 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
14e4:d612 was found in D-Link DIR-885L and Netgear R8500. It's most
likely a bridge used by all 14e4:4365 BCM4366 devices.
Without this fixup device wasn't treated as a bridge:
[ 2.849895] pci 0000:00:00.0: ignoring class 0x020000 (doesn't match header type 01)
and didn't get its resources assigned. This resulted in child devices
not being able to get any resources (due to the parrent missing them):
[ 3.375428] pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 2: no space for [mem size 0x00400000 64bit]
[ 3.387949] pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 2: failed to assign [mem size 0x00400000 64bit]
[ 3.725797] pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 0: no space for [mem size 0x00008000 64bit]
[ 3.738314] pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 0: failed to assign [mem size 0x00008000 64bit]
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49118 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
It has an important feature (compared to seama) of using multiple input
files, aligning them and padding zeroes until reaching a specified
absolute offset. This is needed for a proper flash layout on NAND. We
want kernel partition to be big enough to handle future updates without
a need to resize it and wipe whole "ubi" partition. It's important as
we don't want to lose block counters.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Backport of r48601
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49116 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
This moves few upstreamed patches and adds DIR-885L dts file. Please
note it doesn't mean this device is supported yet.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49115 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
We can use one code path for BCM4707 rev. 4 and BCM53018.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49092 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
* Adjust the default version number in include/version.mk to 15.05.1
* Copy the correct download repo location from include/version.mk
to base-files/image-config.in
After the change to version.mk, new builds made from CC sources will
have opkg config that downloads from the recent 15.05.1 packages repo
instead of the ancient 15.05 packages repo.
The change to image-config.in ensures that if somebody uses
VERSIONOPT config options in .config, he will get the
correct download repo address (instead of trunk snapshots).
Signed-off-by: Hannu Nyman <hannu.nyman@iki.fi>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49053 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Backport of r49037
Some parts of this package were named rt73-pci-firmware before which
looks like a copy and past error. This renames all parts to rt73-usb-
firmware and then the firmware gets build and the dependencies from the
package with the kernel module are also working correctly.
This fixes#22069
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49038 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Apart from using our new building system there are 2 more changes:
1) Limit amount of images
So far we were generating all standard images (optimized one and two
with no loader) for every SUBTARGET. This is not needed, as e.g. the
only device requiring gzipped kernel is legacy Huawei E970.
2) Change output names
The new image building system requires specifying device name. This
forced picking some and resulted in:
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-squashfs.trx
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-squashfs-gz.trx
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-squashfs-noloader-nodictionary.trx
becoming:
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-standard-squashfs.trx
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-standard-noloader-gz-squashfs.trx
openwrt-brcm47xx-$(SUBTARGET)-standard-noloader-nodictionarylzma-squashfs.trx
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Backport of r49006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49007 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
This only drops WGR614 V9 which has 2 MiB flash and it's unlikely to get
any interest.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Backport of r48975
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@49003 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Without this patch curl does not detect the new cyassl/wolfssl version
and would be build without ssl support instead when cyassl was selected.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48900 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Backport of r48897
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48899 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Backport of r48895
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48898 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Remove the kmod-mt76 package from the EX2700 profile to free up
around 100 KiB of space on the root filesystem.
This patch applies to both trunk and Chaos Calmer.
Signed-off-by: Joseph C. Lehner <joseph.c.lehner@gmail.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48887 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Backport of r48883
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48884 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Backport of r46903
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48878 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
With ASM support enabled, CyaSSL fails to build on all x86 subtargets.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org>
Backport of r48876
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48877 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Backport of:
r46167: cyassl: version bump to 3.4.6
r46168: cyassl: update to wolfssl 3.6.0
r46551: cyassl: the upstream package in version 4.6.0 changed
r47791: cyassl: update to wolfSSL version 3.7.0
This version and version 3.6.8 are fixing the following security problems:
* CVE-2015-7744
* CVE-2015-6925
r48616: cyassl: update to wolfssl version 3.8.0
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48873 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
This fixes the following security problem:
CVE-2016-0755: NTLM credentials not-checked for proxy connection re-use
http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20160127B.html
backport of r48614.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48872 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Commit r48849 changed the drivers/mtd/spi-nor/spi-nor.c file and broke
this patch in bcm53xx.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48871 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
CVE-2016-0704
s2_srvr.c overwrite the wrong bytes in the master-key when applying
Bleichenbacher protection for export cipher suites. This provides a
Bleichenbacher oracle, and could potentially allow more efficient variants of
the DROWN attack.
CVE-2016-0703
s2_srvr.c did not enforce that clear-key-length is 0 for non-export ciphers.
If clear-key bytes are present for these ciphers, they *displace* encrypted-key
bytes. This leads to an efficient divide-and-conquer key recovery attack: if
an eavesdropper has intercepted an SSLv2 handshake, they can use the server as
an oracle to determine the SSLv2 master-key, using only 16 connections to the
server and negligible computation. More importantly, this leads to a more
efficient version of DROWN that is effective against non-export ciphersuites,
and requires no significant computation.
CVE-2016-0702
A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of
RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an
attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-
threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
CVE-2016-0799
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally
the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory
location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory
allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size
of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in
processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur.
The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is
passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in
this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions
when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications
that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources.
OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out
ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is
not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via
remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these
issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
CVE-2016-0797
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int
value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large
values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because
|i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL
leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case
memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently
sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This
could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user
applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be
a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that
is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command
line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
CVE-2016-0798
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing memory
management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly allocated, and
sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of distinguishing
these two cases. Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide
valid login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker connecting
with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around 300 bytes per
connection. Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not
configure a seed are not vulnerable. In Apache, the seed directive is known as
SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed. To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However, note
that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the indistinguishability of valid
and invalid logins. In particular, computations are currently not carried out
in constant time.
CVE-2016-0705
A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys
and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that
receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered
rare.
CVE-2016-0800
A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS
sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a
Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and non-
vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting SSLv2
and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or POP)
shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is known
as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800). Recovering one session key requires the attacker to
perform approximately 2^50 computation, as well as thousands of connections to
the affected server. A more efficient variant of the DROWN attack exists
against unpatched OpenSSL servers using versions that predate 1.0.2a, 1.0.1m,
1.0.0r and 0.9.8zf released on 19/Mar/2015 (see CVE-2016-0703 below). Users can
avoid this issue by disabling the SSLv2 protocol in all their SSL/TLS servers,
if they've not done so already. Disabling all SSLv2 ciphers is also sufficient,
provided the patches for CVE-2015-3197 (fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1r and 1.0.2f)
have been deployed. Servers that have not disabled the SSLv2 protocol, and are
not patched for CVE-2015-3197 are vulnerable to DROWN even if all SSLv2
ciphers are nominally disabled, because malicious clients can force the use of
SSLv2 with EXPORT ciphers. OpenSSL 1.0.2g and 1.0.1s deploy the following
mitigation against DROWN: SSLv2 is now by default disabled at build-time.
Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.
Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl,
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the
application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery
have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2
56-bit DES are no longer available. In addition, weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up
are now disabled in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured
with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength
ciphers.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org>
Backport of r48868.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48869 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
OpenWrt should support an optional /etc/profile.d directory like
most other Linux distributions. This allows packages to install
their own scripts into /etc/profile.d/ directory.
The file suffix should make clear, that these scripts
are (sourced) shell-snippets. If the user needs e.g. php or lua,
one must make sure that the interpreter is called.
The reverse failsafe test makes sure, that the effective returncode is 0.
A typcal usecase is the inclusion of private helpers,
special variables or aliases, which at the moment needs
patching the sourcecode and is not well maintainable.
Now the builder can simply add there files.
v1 initial work of Hendrik Lüth <hendrik@linux-nerds.de>
v2 changes regarding RFC (e.g. thomas.langer@lantiq.com)
v3 changes regarding RFC (e.g. mschiffer@universe-factory.net)
v4 keep it simple and mimic OpenWrt style
Signed-off-by: Bastian Bittorf <bittorf@bluebottle.com>
Backport of r46965
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48862 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
